Author Archives: darioringach

Not Difficult To Grasp

Paralysis can have tremendous negative consequences for a person’s quality of life.  In the US alone, there are more than 200 thousand people living with chronic spinal cord injury, which is a cause of immense suffering to them and their families.  The disease generates economic burden for society as well.   Thus, there has been a lot of interest in using our knowledge of how movement is coded in the brain to allow patients to bypass nerve injuries and communicate directly with the environment.  Moreover, when asked about their priorities in terms of regaining motor function the vast majority of patients rank regaining arm and hand function as most important.

It is thus encouraging to read in Nature today an update on how these efforts by scientists have allowed a paralyzed patient to reach for a cup, bring it to her lips, and drink from it.

Critical milestones in the development of motor prosthesis for paralyzed patients

As explained in a nice News and Views piece by Andrew Jackson that accompanies the article, this type of work builds on decades of previous research on the neural mechanisms that control arm movements (here, here and here) (blue on the Fig above), on the development of chronic multi-electrode arrays (orange), their recording properties in animals, and on feasibility studies of neural interfaces in monkeys (here, here, here and here) (green), which opened the way to clinical studies in humans (here and here) (purple).

The value of animal research should not be difficult to grasp. The knowledge that allows us to “read out” the planned movements of the patient from different brain regions in order to guide the movement of the robot is critical in the design of the system.  And it is an indisputable fact that such knowledge has been (and continues to be) obtained by experiments in awake, behaving monkeys.

And for those that doubt the true motivation of scientists for doing their work, it is worth noting what Dr. Leigh Hochberg (one of the leading authors of the study) had to say about their results – “The smile on her face … was just a wonderful thing to see.”   Do you want to see her smile too?  Watch this:

Of course the BrainGate system used by Dr. Hochberg and Dr. John Donoghue - director of the Institute for Brain Science at Brown University - is not the only brain-machine interface system under development to restore function in paralysis. In 2008 we wrote about a similar brain implant developed by Dr. Andy Schwartz at the University of Pittsburgh which enabled monkeys to manipulate robotic hands with unprecedented dexterity. Last year we wrote about how Dr. Schwartz’s team had used a different technology known as electrocorticography to enable a paralysed man to manipulate a robotic arm, while Dr. Chet Moritz and colleagues at Wachington National Primate Research Centre, have coupled readings from individual nerve cells to a technology called functional electrical stimulation to restore control to temporarily paralysed muscles in monkeys, an approach that may eventually supersede the use of robotic arms in some patients. It will be fascinating to watch this technology progress into more widespread clinical use over the next decade, and thrilling to think that, impressive as it appears today, we have barely begun to tap the potential of brain-machine interface technology to change lives.

Frans de Waal’s Ethical Arguments Need Clarification

In a recent perspective, Professor Frans de Waal argues that chimpanzees deserve “special moral status.”  The statement comes on the heels of a recent report by the Institute of Medicine who proposed strict criteria on the use of chimps on biomedical research.

According to de Waal there are compelling ethical reasons to ban all invasive work on chimps, but he argues that one should “not throw out the baby with the bathwater by also curtailing non-harmful behavioral research” as well.  He defines ethically permissible research in chimps as “the sort of research I would not mind doing on human volunteers.”

While Prof. de Waal ought to be applauded for sharing his views on the use of chimps in scientific research, I think he moves too fast through weak and vague ethical reasoning to reach his main conclusion.

Opponents of animal research, for example, are likely to point out his definition of ethically permissible research should read instead “the sort of research [one] would not mind doing on human volunteers who also agree to live in captivity in the same conditions as the chimps.” 

They will also point out that human subjects that volunteer in scientific research, whether invasive or behavioral, provide their informed consent.  Moreover, human subjects retain a right to withdraw their participation at any point in time, and they are never deprived from their liberties and freedom.  Opponents of research will further argue harm comes to these animals by the mere fact they are forced to live in captivity.

It is unclear how de Waal would defend his work from the stated position in his perspective. Perhaps the “special moral status” de Waal wants to grant to chimps and other great apes is not meant to be interpreted as including the same basic rights to liberty and freedom as those enjoyed by humans.  If so, he should state this clearly.  His position is vague and confusing because in the same perspective he seems to approve some countries granting great apes legal rights.

There are other problems that emerge from de Waal ill-articulated ethical position.  He states the basis for awarding great apes special moral status is based on their high cognitive skills, as well as their capacity to display empathy and pro-social behavior. At the same time he believes the same intrinsic properties are present in varying degrees in other species – there are many differences between chimps and monkeys in cognitive capacities, but we consider them mostly gradual differences.” Given such graded abilities it is not clear how de Waal would draw a line between those species that deserve such “special moral status” and those that do not.  Or if there are other morally relevant properties that he did not mention.

Finally, I think de Waal correctly points out that humans should not be allowed to blame nature to explain our history of violence, warfare, and male dominance.  The reason is that only humans are capable of reflecting on the question of how is that we should treat others, including non-human living beings.  Yes, we have a moral obligation to consider the interest of other living beings in our actions.  But, as Carl Cohen explained, we should not confuse our moral obligations to other living beings with them having basic rights. Rights entail obligations, but the reverse is not always true.

There is wide agreement (and I concur) that the interests of great apes deserve high moral consideration, more so than those of a mouse or a worm. But it is worth noting that such principle of graded moral status is already implicitly acknowledged in the NIH guidelines which require scientists to use the “lowest” possible species that can yield the information they seek.  In this regard, the IoM panel finding that there is only a minimal need to use chimps in scientific research is not a truly reflection of their inadequacy to model disease (chimps could certainly be used in many studies to answer good scientific questions), but of our existing recognition that they deserve high moral status and that they can only be used under the most  extreme circumstances.

BrainFacts.org goes live!

The increased need and recognition for scientists to engage with public and policymakers on the importance and value of their work has been reflected by BrainFacts.org going live this week.

This important public education initiative from The Kavli Foundation, the Gatsby Charitable Foundation, and the Society for Neuroscience is an exciting development.  Leading scientists from around the world form the editorial board who will provide an authoritative source of information on neuroscience research.

According to the web site its goal will be to inform the public about exciting discoveries related to brain structure and function; provide science educators with easy-to-use, fun, scientifically valid resources, to use in — and beyond — the classroom; explore the growing understanding about the biological foundations of neurological and psychiatric diseases that affect about one billion people worldwide; and spark dialogue about the progress, potential, and importance of neuroscience research.

BrainFacts.org will provide an authoritative source of information about brain research.

The site already contains useful information on the role of animals in brain research.  One section describes the steps and regulations in animal research, another explains the the use of animal models, and yet another gives specific examples on the advancement of medical knowledge that resulted from the use of animals in research.  Interviews with researchers exemplify how to communicate animal research to the public.  There is also information of particular interest to policymakers.  Finally, the site offers answers to some common myths about the brain, and if you have a question, you can always ask an expert.  A large coalition of scientific organizations will generate content for the site.

You can follow BrainFacts on both FaceBook and twitter.

Welcome BrainFacts!

The Golden Goose Awards

Politicians sometimes deride research based on the what they perceive as being “silly” titles of federal funded grants.  If they spot a title that deals with “games”, for example, they may assume it deals with some sort of amusement of little value to society, instead of a deep, powerful branch of mathematics that describes the behavior of competing rational agents with much relevance to voting, economics, cooperation, and so on.  Animal rights activists also enjoy the hobby.  The latest example is IDA’s list of “ridiculous research” ,whose claims were sadly repeated by far too many news journalists who were clearly too lazy check if they were accurate.  There were some honorable exceptions, notably an excellent editorial entitled “When the facts ruin a good spin” in the Times Union, which discusses a project on the role of music as a conditioning stimulus for drug use ends with a statement with which we heartily agree:

What’s “ridiculous,” to borrow the press release’s language, is that we fall for it, over and over, egged on by politicians eager to score easy points. And what’s “wasteful” is the time and energy that could be so much better spent on something other than a cheap shot.”

Back in 1976 the House Committee on Appropriations asked the National Science Foundation “Why does the Foundation persist in supporting research whose results have no apparent value to the American people?“  The NSF responded in part that:

Basic research seeks an understanding  of the laws of nature  without  initial  regard  for specific  utilitarian  value. Ultimately, however, it  is of the  most important  practical significance, because in a broad sense it is the foundation upon  which rests  all technological development.  Applied research builds on the results of basic research, seeking detailed  information  about  a specific situation  whose general laws have  been  discovered by  basic  research.  The  final step  toward  utilization  of research-development is  the systematic  application  of knowledge to  the  design  of  end products. [...]

As we  increase  our  knowledge  of nature  and  mankind,  in order  to adjust  nature  to our survival, safety,  comfort and convenience, we must  depend  upon  scientific research  to clarify the  relationships  of many, many things.  Thus,  we study  atoms,  even  though  they  will never  be seen  by an  unaided  human  eye.  We study  stars  too  faint  to  be  seen without  a  telescope  and  with  wavelengths  which  can  only be  detected  with  radio  receivers  or  photographic  plates. To  understand  geology, we must  look  at  geologic formations  and processes in many  parts  of the world where different  conditions have existed.  To understand  more about the  phenomena  of life, we must  study  the  behavior  of viruses,  single  cells,  plants,  and  animals  of  many  species.

A book was compiled covering various areas of research with Isaac Asimov writing an essay defending the value of basic research.

Thus, it was with some surprise and delight that we read in the news about Rep. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn) understanding the value of basic research.  The Washington Post reports that:

On Wednesday afternoon, Cooper rose to the defense of taxpayer-funded research into dog urine, guinea pig eardrums and, yes, the reproductive habits of the parasitic flies known as screwworms–all federally supported studies that have inspired major scientific breakthroughs.

Together with two colleagues he created the Annual Golden Goose Awards to honor federally funded research  “whose work may once have been viewed as unusual, odd, or obscure, but has produced important discoveries benefiting society in significant ways.”

Studying dog urine, among other stuff deem crazy by animal rights cranks, led to major medical discoveries

The article goes on to describe how research on dog urine led to an understanding of the effects of hormones on the human kidney, how studies in the guinea pig led to a treatment for hearing loss in infants, and how studies on the screwworm led to the effective control of the a deadly parasite that targets cattle.  All these provide additional examples refuting the notion that learning about life processes from animals cannot yield knowledge applicable to human health.

The Golden Goose Award has the backing of the American Association for the Advancement of ScienceAssociation of American Universities (who in 2011 published a series of “Scientific Inquirer” articles skewering dubious politically-motivated attacks on basic science) and the Progressive Policy Institute, who are to be congratulated for this excellent initiative to highlight the importance of basic research.

At the press conference to launch the award Rep. Robert Dold told reporters that “When we invest in science, we also invest in jobs. Research and development is a key part to any healthy economy,” while  Rep. Charlie Dent (R-Penn.) added “It’s critical, and the federal government has an important role to play,” who went on to describe how injecting horses with snake venom might “seem peculiar” but led to the discovery of the first anti-venom.

Taking us, once again, to the concluding words of Asimov’s essay:

Unless we continue with science and gather knowledge, whether or not it seems useful on the spot, we will be buried under our problems and find no way out.  Today’s science is tomorrow’s solution — and tomorrow’s problems , too — and, most of all, it is mankind’s greatest adventure, now and forever.

Straight from the animal rights book

It is that time of the year when animal rights activists, will show up at our workplaces dressed in their favorite animal costumes to spread more nonsense and misinformation about the nature of biomedical research.

One of their favorite claims is that the scientific community treats animals like any other piece of disposable, laboratory equipment — such as a Petri dish or a test tube.

Has anyone wondered where do they come up with such an idea?

The notion comes straight from the animal rights books that provide the theoretical foundation for animal rights theory while rejecting more nuanced positions.

A living being is said to have moral status if we are morally obliged to give weight to its interest independent of their utility to us. But what exactly is the moral status of non-human animals? Among the various positions one can take the two extremes are the easiest to describe.

At one end of the spectrum, we find the argument that animals do not truly experience pain, do not have emotions, they do not have interests of their own, and thus they lack moral status.  According to this view humans can do with animals as we please. Given what is known presently about animal cognition and behavior, it would be difficult to find anyone who would seriously defend the Cartesian position.

At the other end of the spectrum, we find those who hold that the moral status of some animals must equal to that of humans. These theories posit that if a living being has some basic properties (such as a minimum level of sentience according Gary Francione, or being the “subject-of-life criterion” according to Tom Regan) they attain the same moral status as that of a normal human: our moral consideration for a mouse, or a dog, or a child, ought to be exactly the same.

And let me assure you — when they say exactly the same, they mean it.

It is evident that most members of the public, including scientists that work with animals in medical research, prefer to position themselves somewhere between the two extremes. These more nuanced positions can be considered to represent different versions of “animal welfarism” which are based on the notion of graded moral status.  In these theories animals would certainly have higher moral status than inanimate laboratory equipment, but not that of humans. Animal anti-cruelty laws, the Animal Welfare Act, and the NIH guidelines as examples of how rules and regulations were established to acknowledge the moral standing of animals (establishing the “forbidden zone” in the spectrum of positions above).

Prominent animal rights philosophers, however, are not happy with shades of gray in moral decision making and attempt to rob others of adopting nuanced positions.

For example, Elizabeth Harman writes:

We have no reason to posit such degrees of moral status, so we can conclude that moral status is not a matter of degree but is rather on/off: a being has moral status or lacks it.

The idea is to reject the concept of graded moral status.

Gary Francione, agrees:

We have two choices – and only two – when it comes to the moral status of animals.

Tom Regan also concurs writing terms of the “inherent value” of animals:

Two options present themselves concerning the possession by moral agents of inherent value. First, moral agents might be viewed as having this value to varying degrees, so that some may have more of it than others. Second, moral agents might be viewed as having this value equally. The latter view is rationally preferable. […] We must reject the view that moral agents have inherent value in varying degrees. All moral agents are equal in inherent value, if moral agents have inherent value.

These philosophers want to force everyone to choose among the two extreme positions — either we accept the animal rights view or we must be cartesians that assign no moral status to the animals.

Thus the activists claim “If you disagree with us then you must be treating the animals as you treat a Petri dish”.

Nonsense.  It is the extreme views that must be rejected instead.

And the above also explains the need for the costumes, the scary masks, the blood-stained coats, the screams and insults, the misinformation and the lies. For these animal rights activists have neither solid philosophical nor scientific arguments to enter into a serious and civil debate on the role of animals in research and how the work has benefited mankind generation after generation.

Objections to the Marginal Case Argument

Scientists are often challenged with the so-called marginal case argument.

We are asked to spell out the criteria that make our experiments justifiable in animals but not in humans with comparable abilities and therefore comparable interests. These criteria, we are told, must be evaluated for each individual separately (so-called moral individualism). The resulting argument against animal research consists in pointing out that no matter what criteria are selected, it is always possible to find some humans (e.g., the senile, the cognitively impaired or the comatose patient) who should also be candidates for invasive research. According to this line of reasoning, logically consistency demands that we conduct experiments with these human patients along or instead of using animals.  If we are unwilling to do so, then we must be guilty of speciesism.

Same moral status?

Let me bring up a few objections to this argument.

First, it seems clear (to me at least) that the intrinsic properties of an individual cannot possibly be all that matters in assessing moral status of living beings.  If such properties were all that mattered, then we should feel comfortable granting a rock, a dead cat, and human remains the same moral consideration since they can all be classified as inanimate objects with no interests of their own.  And yet, while nobody will object to a child playfully kicking a rock, most will not feel comfortable with him kicking a dead cat for his or her amusement or using human remains in an art project for school.  The suffering such acts will inflict on others must count as well.  Thus, we must reject moral individualism. Once that premise is gone, the entire marginal case scenario falls apart.

Second, even if for the sake of argument one accepts moral individualism, the resulting moral theory is impractical. Are we prepared to evaluate every single individual we encounter in life to decide on his or her moral status?  Should we assess the cognitive abilities of the child now crossing the street? The dog walking with her? The squirrel that just rushed in front of our moving car?  On one hand, consistency demands that we do so, but applicability demands that we come up with a more practical approach. Indeed, our ability to function in daily life is aided by organizing the world into different categories (or kinds) of living beings and making broad assessments of their interests and moral status. Our brain’s ability to quickly recognize species membership facilitates this. It enables us to determine that the squirrel running in front of our car is a living creature and to swerve to avoid running it over—unless doing so would endanger the child crossing the street. In most situations, we can assess the interests of living beings based on the normal life of the members of that species. We have no need to assess the specific interests and moral status of this particular squirrel and this particular child.

Third, the marginal case scenario is nearly always posed by using an impaired human and a non-human animal, rather than a normal human and a non-human animal with super-natural abilities. Why? Because there is a clear difference between these two situations.  On one hand, should an ape appear in front of us, such as in Kafka’s “Report to the Academy”, speaking in fluent English, asking to be treated as a peer, it seems difficult to think we could refuse on any grounds, even if it represents an extraordinary case.  On the other hand, when human patients are impaired from their normal state, in most cases, we have no absolute certainty the condition is permanent.  A cure for Alzheimer’s or autism may possibly be developed in the future and their mental capacities restored.  Moreover establishing the lack of cognitive function with confidence may be more difficult than we have anticipated, with new studies showing that patients in vegetative state may retain some cognitive function. And, as I mentioned earlier, even in cases were science tell us there is no hope for recovery on the horizon, harming these patients would cause suffering in others that must also be taken into consideration.

Finally, there is also a scientific objection: Even if one were to accept on principle the suggestion by animal philosophers and activists that if we experiment on animals we ought to be experimenting on impaired human patients, that population would not be best suited for scientific studies. Patients with pre-existing conditions have a wide range of abnormalities and individual differences that would make it extremely difficult to conduct properly controlled scientific studies.  Thus, in addition to moral considerations, there are valid scientific reasons to reject the proposal of using impaired humans rather than animal subjects in most studies.

Good, bad, useful? Reflections on animal models for Parkinson’s disease research

Parkinson’s disease is a relentless, ruthless neurodegenerative disorder that often strikes in the early “golden years”, around 60 years of age, but sometimes much earlier.  It progressively robs its victims of every capability that makes life enjoyable, from their ability to move, talk, eat by mouth, and in the worst cases, decreasing their cognitive abilities.

In the sixties, pioneering work in animal models, primarily rats, led to the discovery of a “pill” that transformed the lives of many patients by restoring their ability to move and allowing them to perform daily tasks, often continuing to work, travel, and to enjoy sports and family time.  In research that earned him a Nobel prize many years later, Arvid Carlsson and colleagues reproduced in these rats the main chemical deficit that exists in patients, and found that administration of l-dopa (sinemet) could greatly improve the motor deficits of PD patients.

Subsequent work, always based on generating a “model” of the disease in animals by destroying the neuronal cells that also die in patients, have led to refinement of this treatment; additional advances have led to surgical methods (deep brain stimulation) that further improved quality of life for many patients.

Why should we continue to use animals to study this disorder?

First, as any patient will tell you, the available treatments do not work on all the symptoms they experience, such as depression, sleep disorders, and digestive problems that plague their lives often even more deeply than their motor disorders. Second, the current treatments do not cure the disease, and their benefits do not last forever. In time, the treatments progressively lead to side effects, for example uncontrolled movements or spasms that leave the patient to chose between not moving at all or moving too much. Today’s medications do not stop the progressive loss of nerve cells in the brain, which will ultimately lead to disability and death.

A real treatment for the disorder will have to address its root cause and stop its process, perhaps even reverse them. This is where a lot of confusion on the utility and value of the animal models arises. In the press and even the scientific literature there are statements expressing concern that there is “no good model” of Parkinson’s disease, and sometimes that existing models are useless because some drugs that work in animals fail in the clinic.  It is a complex issue that is a source of debate among scientists and lay people alike. However, one has to examine the roots of the problem.

Models are only as good as our understanding of a human disease at a given time. Science is an evolving process and so are our models of disease. There was a time when we did not understand why some people would die from blood transfusion and others did not, because blood types had not yet been discovered. In the case of Parkinson’s disease, we have known for about a century which cells die in the brain of patients but we still do not know why. The early models, those that led to the major breakthroughs in treating some of the symptoms of the disease, reproduce this loss of cells but do not address its mechanism. We now know more about this mechanism because of research on the causes of rare cases of the disease that have a genetic component and run in families. We also know that even though most cases of Parkinson’s disease do not have a clear genetic component, the mechanisms may be the same. New understanding has led to a new generation of models, in which defective genes are introduced in mice to reproduce the mechanisms thought to cause the disease in people.

GM mice help to uncover the processes of Parkinson's disease. Image courtesy of Understanding Animal Research.

Are those models perfect?

No model is perfect. No model can be expected to reproduce all the symptoms that occur in patients. Even if similar, the brain and nervous system of mice are not identical to those of a human, who walks on two legs, not four paws, and can live up to a hundred years rather than two. Yet, a lot of the general functions that are affected by the disorder in humans are present to some extent in the mouse model.

More importantly, only in an animal can one examine the very beginning of the disease process. Many studies in humans have now shown that diseases like Parkinson’s begin to affect a person’s body decades before they even know it. The disease causes subtle changes that are not even perceived as abnormal but have long-term consequences, just as a minute water leak can over years rot a wooden beam and lead to a roof collapse. As the disease progresses, it can manifest itself with minor troubles, so unremarkable that they are not recognized as related to Parkinson’s disease, for example problems with sleep and smell, that are very common and have many different causes.

Thus, in a human, we will never be able to understand the beginning of the disease, the water leak, because we do not know in which individuals they are occurring. This is where animal models are the most useful. By reproducing anomalies, such as the overexpression of the protein alpha-synuclein, that cause the disease in people, we can study the mechanisms from the beginning and find ways to stop the damage as early as possible.

Why then are people writing that animal models of Parkinson’s disease did not accurately predict whether a new treatment can be effective in patients? For one thing, those drawbacks were largely based on old models, which were – and still are – useful for some things (developing treatments for symptoms and evaluating new approaches to restoring lost function such as gene therapy) but were only minimally productive in developing treatments to halt the development of Parkinson’s disease because of our limited knowledge of mechanisms at the time.

Will the new models be better at predicting drug efficacy in the clinic? It is too early to tell because none of the new compounds developed and currently being tested in these models has yet been tested in patients. Should these animal models be replaced by computer modeling of the disease?  Probably, but this is years in the future. The science of modeling all the molecular interactions that take place within a cell, and of all the connections this cell establishes with other cells in a complex organism in a way that could illuminate a disease process and make sound predictions leading to effective treatments is in its infancy. In the meantime, patients are diagnosed, grow worse, and die every day.

We cannot wait. Just as previous models, although imperfect, led to transforming discoveries that bought years of functioning to patients who otherwise would have been locked in a chair and condemned to an early death, the new models continue to lead every day to discoveries that bring us closer to an effective treatment. Nothing can replace them at the moment.

Marie-Francoise Chesselet, M.D., Ph.D.
Charles H. Markham Professor of Neurology
University of California, Los Angeles

Of what use?

By Isaac Asimov

One may detest nature and despise science, but it becomes more and more difficult to ignore them.  Science in the modern world is not an entertainment for some devotees.  It is on its way to becoming every-body’s business.  — Theodosius Dobzhansky, in The Biology of Ultimate Concern.

It is the fate of the scientist to face the constant demand that he show his learning to have some “practical use.”  Yet it may not be of interest to him to have such a “practical use” exist; he may feel that the delight of learning, of understanding, of probing the universe, is its own reward.  In that case, he might even allow himself the indulgence of contempt for anyone who asks more.

There is a famous story of a student who asked the Greek philosopher Plato, about 370 B.C., of what use were the elaborate and abstract theorems he was being taught.  Plato at once ordered a slave to give the student a small coin that he might not think he had gained knowledge for nothing, then had him dismissed from the school.

The student need not have asked and Plato need not have scorned.  Who would today doubt that mathematics has its uses? Mathematical theorems, which seem unbearably refined and remote from anything a sensible man can have any interest in, turn out to be absolutely necessary to such highly essential part of our modern life as, for instance, the telephone network that knits the world together.

This story of Plato, famous for two thousand years, has not made matters plainer to most people.  Unless the application of a new discovery is clear and present, most are dubious of its value.

A story about the English scientist Michael Faraday illustrates the point.  In his time, he was an enormously popular lecturer, as well as a physicist and chemist of the first rank.  In one of his lectures in the 1840s, he illustrated the peculiar behavior of a magnet in connection with a spiral coil of wire which was connected to a galvanometer that would record the presence of an electric current.

There was no current in the wire to begin with, but when the magnet was thrust into the hollow center of the spiral coil, the needle of the galvanometer moved to one side of the scale, showing that a current was flowing.  When the magnet was withdrawn from the coil , the needle flipped in the other direction, showing that the current was now flowing the other way.  When the magnet was held motionless in any position within the coil, there was no current at all, and the needle was motionless.

At the conclusion of the lecture, one member of the audience approached Faraday and said, “Mr. Faraday, the behavior of the magnet and the coil of wire was interesting, but of what possible use can it be?”  Faraday answered politely, “Sir, of what use is a newborn baby?”

It was precisely the phenomenon whose use was questioned so peremptorily by one of the audience that Faraday made use to develop the electric generator, which, for the first time, made it possible to produce electricity cheaply and in quantity.  That, in turn, made it possible to build the electrified technology that surrounds us today and without which life, in the modern sense, is inconceivable.  Faraday’s demonstration was a new-born baby that grew into a giant.

Even the shrewdest of men cannot always judge what is useful and what is not.  There never was a man so ingeniously practical in judging the useful as Thomas Alva Edison, surely the greatest inventor who ever lived, and we can take him as our example.

In 1868, he patented his first invention.  It was a device to record votes mechanically.  By using it, congressmen could press a button and all their votes would be recorded and totaled instantly.  There was no question that the invention worked; it remained only to sell it.  A congressman whom Edison consulted, however, told him, with mingled amusement and horror, that there wasn’t a chance of the invention being accepted, however unfailingly it might work.  A slow vote, it seemed, was sometimes a political necessity.  Some congressmen might have their opinions changed in the course of a slow vote, whereas a quick vote might, in a moment of emotion, commit the Congress to something undesirable.

Edison, chagrined, learned his lesson.  After that, he decided never to invent anything unless he was sure it would be needed and wanted and not merely because it worked.

He stuck to that.  Before he died, he had obtained nearly 1,300 patents — 300 of them over a four-year stretch, or one every five days, on the average.  Always he was guided by his notion of the useful and the practical.

On October 21, 1879, he produced the first practical electric light, perhaps the most astonishing of all his inventions. (We need only sit by candlelight for a while during a power breakdown to discover how much we accept and take for granted the electric light.)

In succeeding years, Edison labored to improve the electric light and, mainly, to find ways of making the glowing filament last longer before breaking.  As was usual with him, he tried everything he could think of.  One of his hit-or-miss efforts was to seal a metal wire into the evacuated electric light bulb, near the filament but not touching it, the two separated by a small gap of vacuum.

Edison then turned on the electric current to see if the presence of the metal wire would somehow preserve the life of the glowing filament.  It didn’t, and he abandoned the approach.  However, he could not help noticing that an electric current seem to flow from the filament to the wire across  the vacuum gap.

Nothing in Edison’s vast practical knowledge of electricity explained that phenomenon, and all Edison could do was to observe it, write it up in his notebooks, and, in 1884 (being Edison), patent it.  The phenomenon was called the “Edison effect,” and it was the inventor’s only discovery in pure science.  Edison could see no use for it.  He therefore pursued the matter no further and let it go, while he continued the chase for what he considered the useful and the practical.

In 1880s and 1890s, however, scientists who pursued “useless” knowledge for its own sake, discovered that subatomic particles (eventually called “electrons”) existed, and that electric current was accompanied by a flow of electrons.  The Edison effect was the result of the ability of electrons, under certain conditions, to travel unimpeded through as vacuum.

In 1904, the English electrical engineer John Ambrose Fleming (who had worked win Edison’s London office in the 1880s in connection with the developing electric-light industry) made use of the Edison effect and of the new understanding that the electron theory had brought.  He devised an evacuated glass bulb with a filament and a wire which would let the current through in one direction but not in the other.  The result was a “current rectifier.”

In 1906, the American inventor Lee De Forest made a further elaboration of Fleming’s device, introducing a metal plate that enabled it to amplify electric current as well as to rectify it.  The result is called a “radio tube” by Americans.

It is called that because only such as device could handle an electric current with sufficient rapidity and delicacy to make the radio a practical instrument for receiving and transmitting sound carried by the fluctuating amplitude of radio waves.  In fact, the radio tube made all of our modern electronic equipment possible — including television.

The Edison effect, then, which the practical Edison shrugged off as interesting but useless, turned out to have more astonishing results than any of his practical devices.  In a power breakdown, candles and kerosene lamps can substitute (however poorly) for the electric light, but what substitute is there for a television screen?  We can live without it (if we consider it only as an entertainment device, which does it wrong), but not many people seem to want to.

In fact, the problem isn’t a matter of showing that pure science can be useful.  It is much more difficult problem to find some branch of science that isn’t useful. Between 1900 and 1930, for instance, theoretical physics underwent a revolution.  The theory of relativity and the development of quantum mechanism led to a new and more subtle understanding of the basic laws of the universe and of the behavior of the inner components of the atom.

None of it seemed it seemed to have the slightest use for mankind, and the scientists involved — a brilliant group of young men — apparently had found an ivory tower for themselves that nothing could disturb.  Those who survived into later decades looked back on that happy time of abstraction and impracticality as a Garden of Eden out of which they had been evicted.  For out of that abstract work there unexpectedly came the nuclear bomb, and a world that now lives in terror of a possible war that could destroy mankind in a day.

But it did not bring only terror.  Out of that research also came radio-isotopes, which have made it possible to  probe the workings of living tissue with a delicacy otherwise quite impossible, and whose findings have revolutionized medicine in thousand ways.  There are also nuclear power stations, which, at present and in the future, offer mankind the brightest hope of ample energy during all his future existence on earth.

There is nothing, it turns out, that is more practical, more downright important to the average man, whether for good or for evil, than the ivory-tower researches of the young men of the early twentieth century who could see no use in what they were doing and were glad of it, for they wanted only to revel in knowledge of its own sake.

The point is that we cannot foresee the consequences in detail.  Plato, in demonstrating the theorems of geometry, did not envisage a computerized society.  Faraday knew that his magnet-induced electric current was a new-born baby, but he surely did not foresee our electrified technology.  Edison certainly didn’t foresee a television set when he puzzled over the electric current that leaped the vacuum, and Einstein, when he worked out the equation E = mc2 from purely theoretical considerations in 1905, did not sense the mushroom cloud as he did so.

We can only make the general rule that, though all of history, an increased understanding of the universe, however out-of-the-way a particular bit of new knowledge may seem, however ethereal, however abstract, however useless, has always ended in some practical application (even if sometimes only indirectly).

The application cannot be predicted, but we can be sure that it will have both its beneficial and its uncomfortable aspects.  (The discovery of the germ theory of disease by Louis Pasteur in the 1860s was the greatest single advance ever made in medicine and led to the saving of countless millions of lives.  Who can quarrel with that?  Yet it also has led , in great measure, to the dangerous population explosion of today.)

It remains for the wisdom of mankind to make the decisions by which advancing knowledge will be used well or not ill, but all the wisdom of mankind will never improve the material lot of man unless advancing knowledge presents it with the matters over which it can make those decisions.  And when, despite the most careful decisions, there come dangerous side-effects of the new knowledge, only still-further advances in knowledge will offer hope for correction.

And now we stand in the closing decades of the twentieth century, with science advancing as never before in all sorts of odd, and sometimes apparently useless, ways.  We’ve discovered quasars and pulsars in the distant heavens.  Of what use are they to the average man? Astronauts have brought back rocks from the moon at great expense.  So what? Scientists discover new compounds, develop new theories, work out new mathematical complexities.  What for?  What’s in it for you?

No one knows what’s in it for you right now, any more than Plato knew in his time, or Faraday knew, or Edison knew, or Einstein knew.

But you will know if you live long enough; and if not, your children or grandchildren will know.  And they will smile at those who say, “But what is the use of sending rockets into space?” just as we know smile at the person who asked Faraday the use of his demonstration.

In fact, unless we continue with science and gather knowledge, whether or not it seems useful on the spot, we will be buried under our problems and find no way out.  Today’s science is tomorrow’s solution — and tomorrow’s problems , too — and, most of all, it is mankind’s greatest adventure, now and forever.

From the introduction to “The greatest adventure: basic research that shapes our lives”, Eds. E. H. Kone and H. J. Jordan, Rockefeller University Press, 1974.